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he answer to the question posed in the title
is yes, no, and maybe, according to President
Santomero. Yes: the government must absorb
some of the risks inherent in the banking
system in order to maintain the system￿s stability. No:
regulations that ignore the self-interested reactions of
both bankers and their customers will not serve those
customers well. And maybe: bank regulations, in
principle, can help if they increase competition or the
flow of information. In practice, however, some
regulations designed to improve the quality of
information have met with mixed success. President
Santomero suggests that focusing on improving both
financial literacy and information disclosure might be
more productive.
Anthony M. Santomero, President,
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
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T
Does Bank Regulation Help Bank
Customers?
Since becoming a central
banker, I have been considering the
question: ￿Does bank regulation help
bank customers?￿ As a long-time
economist, my answer is: ￿Sometimes
yes. Sometimes no. It all depends.￿
BANKS CANNOT SERVE THEIR
CUSTOMERS WITHOUT SOME
REGULATION
One way in which bank
regulation and the associated process of
supervisory oversight help customers is
by keeping the banking system stable.
At the most basic level, stability means
that banks can provide a safe place to
make deposits, and one that gives ready
and reliable access to them when
needed.
Bank regulations focused on
ensuring that banks prudently manage
the risks in their portfolios and that they
maintain adequate capital against
unforeseen contingencies are part of a
government infrastructure designed to
bring stability to the overall financial
system. For the U.S. banking sector, this
infrastructure has evolved over the last
century. It includes prudential regu-
lation along with FDIC deposit insur-
ance, the Fed￿s discount window, and
the Fed￿s bank-to-bank payment system,
called Fedwire. Each piece is necessary
to ensure a stable banking system.
The core business of a bank is
to take in deposits and make loans.
Theoretically, depositors could look at
the bank￿s balance sheet, assess the
riskiness of the loans and securities out-
standing, and determine the overall
riskiness of the institution. If the risk
level were too high for a depositor￿s
taste, he could take his deposit
elsewhere.
The reality, of course, is
considerably different. Depositors
cannot assess the risks in the bank￿s loan
portfolio very easily, since banks devote
time and resources to developing an
intimate understanding of the risk
characteristics of a particular lending
opportunity. The assets banks put on
their books reflect their case-by-case
judgments. Since depositors cannot see
their bank￿s risk profile clearly, they
cannot accurately assess the risk to
which their deposits are exposed. This
uncertainty creates the potential for
instability in the banking system.
A banking panic is the classic
manifestation of this instability. Some
event, real or imagined, convinces
depositors that their bank cannot meet
its obligations to all of them, and so they
rush to the bank to get their money
back before the bank fails. Of course,
depositors at other banks are also
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uncertain about risk exposure of their
deposits. The depositors at another
institution observe the activity at the
troubled bank, which increases the
uncertainty they have about their own
institution. So, the run at one bank
could easily upend their confidence in
their bank. Thus, the run becomes
contagious, setting off a genuine
banking panic.
We think of banking panics as
a thing of the past. You have to go back
to the Great Depression to find a
banking panic in the United States.
One important reason is that, at that
time, the federal government created
the FDIC insurance program to protect
the average depositor from losses,
regardless of the fate of his or her bank.
Deposit insurance has been
proven successful, not only by the track
record of the banking system in the U.S.
since its introduction but also by the fact
that the governments of most industri-
alized countries have adopted deposit
insurance schemes of one type or
another. In fact, explicit deposit insur-
ance is required for all countries seeking
entry into the European Union.
Government insurance for the
individual depositor eliminates one
potential source of instability to the
banking system, but it creates another
one. It gives banks the incentive to
overload their portfolios with risky assets.
Insured depositors do not bear any of the
risk the bank takes on, so they don￿t
demand a risk premium in the interest
rate they are paid on their deposits. And
since equity holders face limited liability,
they don￿t bear the downside risk when
the bank takes a chance on a high-
return, high-risk asset.
With the natural market
mechanism disabled, the government
must introduce its own regulation and
supervision of banks to ensure that they
are properly limiting their risk exposure.
In short, through a combination of
deposit insurance and bank regulation,
the government has introduced greater
stability into the banking system, despite
depositors￿ inevitable uncertainties about
the risk profile of their bank.
Banks￿ role in the payment
system is a second feature of the bank-
ing business that creates the potential for
instability. Banks routinely make
payments for their depositors. Indeed,
most consumers keep a bank account
primarily so that they can write checks,
make and receive electronic payments,
and get cash to make purchases.
But this role for banks creates a
strong interdependence among them,
and because of this interdependence, a
problem at one institution can quickly
put the entire banking system at risk. A
simple example will make the point. A
check written by one of
Bank A￿s customers is
presented to Bank A by
Bank B. Normally, Bank A
pays Bank B by transferring
funds from its account at
the Fed to Bank B￿s
account at the Fed. It does




Bank A has insufficient
funds in its Fed account.
This could happen for any
number of reasons, from a
mismatch of inflows and
outflows during the course
of a busy day to an opera-
tions disruption, as hap-
pened at some New York
banks on September 11. If
Bank A cannot pay Bank
B, Bank B may not be able
to make a payment it owes to Bank C,
and so on. Again, problems at one bank
become contagious, and the entire
banking system fails to deliver the basic
payments services its customers count
on. Worse, if the payments are large
enough, the liquidity or solvency of the
entire financial system is at risk.
The Federal Reserve uses two
devices to contain the systemic risk
created by banks￿ role in the payments
system. First, the Fed guarantees that all
Fedwire payments are final. That is, if
the Fed moves funds from Bank A￿s
account into Bank B￿s during the course
of the day, the Fed will not rescind that
payment, even if Bank A is insolvent at
the end of the day. Second, the Fed
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makes discount window loans available
to otherwise healthy banks that have
insufficient funds and no place else to
borrow them at the end of the day. This
prevents our hypothetical Bank A from
closing out the day insolvent.
Serving as a guarantor of
payments and lender of last resort
contains one threat to the stability of the
banking system, but like deposit
insurance, it also creates the incentive
for individual banks to take on too
much risk. Banks know that if, at the
end of the day, a bank does not have
sufficient funds to make its payments,
the Fed will step in and provide the
necessary funds. So, banks do not
concern themselves as much as they
should about their reserve position or the
positions of the banks from which they
are collecting payments.
Again, with marketplace
oversight of risks neutralized, bank
regulators and supervisors must step in to
ensure that banks are properly limiting
their risk positions. Therefore, it takes a
combination of serving as payments
guarantor, lender of last resort, and bank
regulator for the government to bring
greater stability to the banking system,
despite banks￿ interdependence in
payments.
So, yes, bank regulation does
help bank customers ￿ and in a way
that one does not always think about ￿
by helping to ensure the stability of the
banking system.
A stable banking system
benefits more than just bank customers
￿ it is an essential element of a strong
economy. It helps gather people￿s savings
and channel them to the most produc-
tive investment opportunities available.
That kind of investment in new
equipment and new technologies is an
essential engine of growth and rising
standards of living. Indeed, improving
overall economic performance is govern-
ment￿s ultimate purpose in building the
banking infrastructure that it has over
the past century.
middle ground. Legislation passed in the
1930s made banking arguably the most
heavily regulated industry in the United
States. Gradually, we have been dis-
mantling the unnecessary, burdensome,
and even counterproductive regulations
that have thwarted the legitimate
workings of the marketplace. At the
same time, we have been trying to
devise regulations to eliminate the
genuine flaws in the marketplace that




However, this middle ground is
hard to find and harder to tread. But we
can find some lessons in the mistakes
and successes of the past. Perhaps the
clearest is that regulators can achieve
their goals only if they respect the power
of the marketplace.
There are clear-cut cases of
bank regulations that failed to achieve
their intended goals because regulators
failed to take into account the market
forces at work and the capacity of
bankers, and occasionally consumers, to
innovate around a regulatory barrier
when it is in their interest.
Attempts to regulate market
prices ￿ or, in the case of banking,
market interest rates ￿ offer an
instructive example. Under Regulation
Q, the Fed was authorized to set ceilings
on the interest rates that banks paid on
their deposits. The intention was to
supply banks with funds at relatively low
cost and thereby hold down interest
rates on bank loans, particularly
residential mortgages. But in the 1970s
market interest rates on other savings
instruments rose above the Reg Q
ceilings, and the result was a reduced
supply of funds to banks and a harder
DO BANK CUSTOMERS NEED
SPECIAL PROTECTION?
So, we might pose the
following question. Suppose the banking
industry is operating with government-
provided deposit insurance, payments
guarantees, and lending facilities.
Further suppose that supervisory and
regulatory mechanisms are in place to
manage the risk exposures that these
programs create. Finally, suppose that
within this environment, banks are free
to offer any financial service, serve any
market segment, and charge any price.
Would a ￿free market￿ serve bank
customers￿ interests best, or would such
a marketplace be inimical to the
interests of bank customers?
This is not an easy question to
answer. Today, most people would lean
toward the first view. Given that the
market for financial services is an
intensely competitive one, banks have
strong incentives to deliver at fair prices
a broad array of products and services
that effectively meet the needs of their
diverse customer base.
Historically, most people,
including researchers, politicians, and
policymakers, were not always of this
opinion. During the1930s, in the midst
of the Great Depression, people leaned
heavily in the other direction. The
thinking was that there existed
substantial need for rules and regula-
tions to protect bank customers from the
unbridled workings of the marketplace,
which included both monopoly and
customer exploitation.
As you might imagine, the
truth lies somewhere in between these
two views. Indeed, the history of
banking legislation and the regulation of
banks over the past 75 years has been
essentially a story about finding that
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time for mortgage borrowers. Savers
withdrew their bank deposits to buy
higher yielding assets. Meanwhile,
potential mortgage borrowers found
their options reduced and their local
bank in dire financial straits.
Not long after, some state
banking regulators tried to impose usury
ceilings, or interest rate caps, on
consumer credit, including installment
loans and credit cards issued by banks
operating in their jurisdictions. The
intention was to make credit available to
state residents at lower interest rates.
However, the providers of consumer
credit skirted the regulation. They
simply ceased issuing credit in those
states and moved to states where usury
ceilings were not in force. The financial
activity in Delaware is a testimony to
banks￿ ability to shift operations to more
friendly terrain. Delaware is now home
to nearly half the credit cards issued in
the U.S.
As these attempts to regulate
market prices and other examples of
restrictions on product features,
organizational structure, or market
geography show, regulation will not
deliver the intended result unless that
result serves the interests of those on
both sides of the market: bankers and
their customers.
Over the past 20 years, in
particular, we have acted vigorously to
remove the rules and regulations that
stifle competition and innovation. The
Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980
eliminated many restrictions on banks￿
pricing and product offerings. Next,
limitations on banks￿ market area were
set aside. The Garn-St. Germain Act of
1982 allowed bank holding companies
headquartered in one state to acquire
banks in other states. The Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act of 1994 permitted banks
headquartered in one state to open
branches in other states if permitted by
state law.
This process of deregulation
brought positive results. It intensified
competition among banks, inducing
them to expand product offerings,
increase efficiency, align prices with
production costs, and improve service to
their target customers.
Recently, the string of pro-
market legislation culminated in the
passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
also known as the Financial Modern-
ization Act of 1999. This act repeals the
long-standing Glass-Steagall Act of 1933
that had prohibited banks from affili-
ating with securities firms and insurance
companies. Under Gramm-Leach-Bliley,
banks, insurance companies, securities
firms, and other financial institutions
can affiliate under common ownership
and offer their customers a complete
range of financial services.
The ultimate impact of
Gramm-Leach-Bliley is yet to be
realized. Will people want one-stop
shopping for financial services at a
financial ￿supermarket￿? Or do they
prefer shopping in a financial services
￿mall,￿ purchasing services from a
variety of different specialized providers?
With the presence of both big institu-
tions and niche players, people have a
choice. Probably, both types of institu-
tions will do well because consumers￿
tastes and preferences are not uniform.
The virtue of the current structure is
that the mix of suppliers in the financial





This is not to say that the
banking marketplace functions perfectly
and there is no need for regulations
aimed at helping bank customers.
Regulators￿ primary focus today has
shifted away from product and price
restrictions and toward improving the
quality of market information available
to consumers.
For any market to function
properly, those buying the good or
service must fully understand their
choices, what they are buying, and what
they are not. In the marketplace for
financial services, this is a challenge.
Financial products and services have
many complex features, and innovative
financial firms armed with the latest in
information technology are creating
more sophisticated products and services
all the time.
To help consumers make more
informed choices, regulators have
pushed for greater clarity in loan
documents and financial disclosure
statements. The first step was to
standardize the information on
disclosure forms. Truth-in-Lending and
Truth-in-Saving regulations are two
classic examples.
Truth-in-Lending establishes a
standard formula that lenders must
follow in disclosing the interest rates and
fees they will charge on a particular
loan. The regulators￿ aim is to give
consumers the information they need to
do some ￿comparison shopping￿ when
they look for a loan. Truth-in-Saving
does the same thing for investment
products.
Have these regulations
worked? The fact is that the required
disclosure forms have been attacked
from both sides. Lenders claim the
disclosure statements are expensive to
produce. Consumer advocates argue
that they are imprecise and difficult to
understand. Both sides have valid
points, but these are issues about
particulars. Such disclosures are steps in
the right direction, and regulators
should work to refine and improve
them.
But we must go beyond
improved disclosure statements for the
banking marketplace to function
smoothly and deliver maximum benefit
to all its potential customers. We must
build consumers￿ understanding of the
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their level of financial literacy is com-
mensurate with the sophistication of
today￿s financial marketplace.
In the burgeoning subprime
lending market, where concerns about
predatory lending have sprung up, we
see some momentum toward increasing
financial literacy today.
REGULATION AND DEREGULA-
TION GIVE RISE TO SUBPRIME
LENDING MARKET
While the subprime lending
market is relatively new, it has had a
fairly long gestation period. When the
banking marketplace was heavily
regulated, banks allocated consumer
credit sparingly. Good or ￿prime￿
borrowers received credit; others did
not. In the early 1970s, legislators and
regulators wanted to ensure that banks
provided equal access to credit for all
segments of their market area, including
low- and moderate-income commun-
ities. The Community Reinvestment
Act and associated regulations
encouraged banks to target bankable
assets in these previously untapped
market segments, essentially extending
credit availability down-market.
Lending volumes grew rapidly in this
area, and bankers became more familiar
with the lending opportunities available.
Initially, banks were able to
charge high interest rates to these new
borrowers. But, in recent years, as
deregulation and innovation have
intensified competition among banks
and other financial service providers,
those interest rates have declined
substantially.
This is not to say that the
interest rates on subprime loans were
driven to equality with the rate on prime
loans. However, the interest rates banks
charged and the amounts they were
willing to lend to subprime borrowers
reflected a reasonable assessment of the
higher loss rates and differential risk
involved. In short, a reasonably well
functioning subprime lending market
has been established. The initial
impetus, which came from legislators￿
and regulators￿ imperative that banks
expand access to credit, was largely
successful.
PREDATORY LENDING
But along with these positive
developments in subprime lending have
come alarming incidents of abusive
practices by some lenders operating in
that market. These practices ￿ often
targeted at elderly women and
minorities ￿ are commonly referred to
as predatory lending.
As the competition drove
banks and other lenders to expand the
subprime market, credit was made
available to more people relatively
unfamiliar with the financial
marketplace. As research done by
groups like The Reinvestment Fund in
Philadelphia shows, the sad truth is that
some unethical lenders take unfair
advantage of the situation, exploiting
customers￿ naivete and convincing them
to take on mortgages with onerous, and
often unrealistic, terms, charging
excessive fees or exorbitant interest
rates, rolling in hidden costs or unneces-
sary insurance, or simply committing
outright fraud.
The root cause of predatory
lending is, of course, the differential
level of knowledge between the lender
and borrower ￿ an extreme case of
what economists call ￿information
asymmetry.￿ It is difficult enough for
mainstream customers to understand
and choose wisely from among the
many complex financial products and
services offered today, but it is an
exceptionally daunting challenge for
those with limited financial experience
or education to make such decisions.
In addition, low-income people
usually have limited access to long-term
credit and can ill-afford to keep money
on hand. Consequently, they are recep-
tive to a sales pitch offering upfront cash
and a long payback period. And when
an unexpected expense comes along,
the need for immediate cash makes
them easy prey for the predatory lender.
I want to reiterate that
subprime lending is by no means
synonymous with predatory lending.
Subprime loans carry a higher interest
rate because they carry a higher risk of
default. This makes perfect sense in a
competitive market where expected loss
and risk determine price. Predatory
loans carry disproportionately high
interest rates or onerous terms not
justified by higher risk. Rather, these
rates or terms are imposed by lenders
willing to exploit a borrower￿s lack of
financial knowledge, market access, or
economic resources.
It is important for regulators to
make this distinction because we want
to put an end to predatory lending
without otherwise impeding the
workings of the subprime lending
market. How do we accomplish this?
Tempting as it may seem, I
doubt that the solution lies in imposing
interest rate ceilings or outlawing certain
terms on loans, given our previous
experience with interest rate ceilings.
Our intention would be to get better
terms for victims of predatory lending.
Instead, we would likely shrink the pool
of funds now available to high-risk, low-
income consumers in the subprime
lending market. And the victims of
predatory lending would likely be no
better off ￿ their economic and
financial circumstances would not
change.
Clearly, the best way to
eliminate predatory lending is to
Clearly, the best way
to eliminate predatory
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eliminate the information asymmetry
that gives rise to it. Consumers who
understand basic personal finance, are
willing to explore their options, and
know how to exercise their contract
rights are less likely to be victimized.
Efforts to advance financial
literacy are booming. In Philadelphia, for
example, the Neighborhood
Reinvestment Corporation, a publicly
funded organization with a solid
reputation for its community informa-
tion and counseling programs, is starting
on a new project to educate low-income
people about home mortgages.
Meanwhile, at the national level, the
American Bankers Association has
formed a working group to educate
bankers and community leaders about
predatory lending.
We at the Federal Reserve are
doing our part to foster greater financial
literacy by providing materials and
supporting local efforts through our
Community and Consumer Affairs
Department. The Fed continues to
pursue basic research into the financial
behavior of consumers at all income
levels, so that we can better understand
how and why they use the financial
system as they do.
My reading of the evidence
from Fed research and elsewhere is that
the need for greater financial literacy
extends well beyond that of low-income
people or other relative neophytes to the
financial marketplace. People generally
know relatively little about the financial
marketplace. Even regular consumers of
various financial services do not really
understand the costs and benefits of
their choices.
CONCLUSION
Let me conclude by returning
to the question with which I began:
Does bank regulation help bank
customers? In some cases, my answer is a
clear yes, though perhaps not in the way
one might at first think. For the nation
to have a sound and stable banking
system, the government must absorb
some of the risks inherent in the system.
In the United States, the government
does so by serving as deposit insurer,
payment guarantor, and lender of last
resort. Having absorbed these risks, the
government must regulate and supervise
banks to ensure they do not introduce
new ones. So bank regulation is part and
parcel of having the sound and stable
banking system that bank customers in
the U.S. enjoy.
In other cases, my answer is a
clear no. Regulations that do not take
into account the self-interested reac-
tions of market participants ￿ both
bankers and bank customers ￿ will not
serve bank customers or achieve any
other regulatory goal. At best they will
have no effect; at worst they will
produce unintended and deleterious
consequences.
Finally, in some cases, my
answer is maybe. In principle, bank
regulations can help bank customers if
they increase the degree of competition
or the flow of information in the
marketplace and thus drive suppliers to
do a better job of meeting their
customers￿ demands. But in practice,
regulations designed to improve the
quality of information, such as Truth-in-
Lending or Truth-in-Saving, have met
with mixed success at best.
Recent developments in the
subprime lending market, particularly
the egregious episodes of predatory
lending, deserve regulators￿ serious
attention. I believe that the most
effective and lasting solution to this
problem lies not in regulation but in
education. Given today￿s fast-growing,
complex, and sophisticated financial
marketplace, raising the general level of
financial literacy among consumers may
be a more productive use of public
resources than any new regulatory
initiative. B R